The Rise of Middle Eastern Crime in Australia
This is a speech by a retired police office
from
Australia
. It is about the rise of crime amongst the Muslims. But the disturbing
part is that the criminals are protected by the entire community of
Muslims and it seems the government is completely helpless to address this
problem. When governments fail to protect their citizens, the citizens
rise to take the law into their own hands. The result is civil war. This
alarming trend is what will happen in all countries where Muslim
immigration is left unchecked. It is truly troubling and scary.
by Tim Priest
2005/12/26
I BELIEVE that the rise of Middle Eastern organised crime in Sydney
will have an impact on society unlike anything we have ever seen.
In the early 1980s, as a young detective I was attached to the Drug
Squad at the old CIB. I remember executing a search warrant at Croydon,
where we found nearly a pound of heroin. I know that now sounds very
familiar; however, what set this heroin apart was that it was Beaker
Valley Heroin, markedly different from any heroin I had seen. Number Four
heroin from the golden triangle of South-East Asia is nearly always
off-white, almost pure diamorphine. This heroin was almost brown.
But more remarkable were the occupants of the house. They were very
recent arrivals from Lebanon, and from the moment we entered the premises,
we wrestled and fought with the male occupants, were abused and spat at by
the women and children, and our search took five times longer because of
the impediments placed before us by the occupants, including the women
hiding heroin in baby nappies and on themselves and refusing to be
searched by policewomen because of religious beliefs. We had never
encountered these problems before.
As was the case in those days, we arrested every adult and teenager who
had hampered our search. When it came to court, they were represented by
Legal Aid, of course, who claimed that these people were innocent of the
minor charges of public disorder and hindering police, because they were
recent arrivals from a country where people have an historical hatred
towards police, and that they also had poor communications skills and that
the police had not executed the warrant in a manner that was acceptable to
the Muslim occupants.
The magistrate, well known to police as one who convicted fewer than
one in ten offenders brought before him during his term at Burwood local
court, threw the matter out, siding with the occupants and condemning the
police. I remember thinking, thank heavens we don’t run into many
Lebanese drug dealers.
In 1994 I was stationed at Redfern. A well known Lebanese family who
lived not far from the old Redfern Police Academy were terrorising the
locals with random assaults, drug dealing, robberies and violent
anti-social behaviour. When some young police from Redfern told me about
them, curiosity got the better of me and I asked them to show me the
street they lived in. Despite the misgivings of the young police, I
eventually saw this family and the presence they had in the immediate
area. As we drove away in our marked police car, a half-brick bounced on
the roof of the vehicle. The driver kept going.
I said, “What are you doing, they’ve just hit the car with a house
brick!”
The young constable said, “Oh, they always do that when we drive
past.”
The police were either too scared or too lazy to do anything about it.
The damage bill on police cars became costly and these street terrorists
grew stronger and the police became purely defensive. You see, the Police
Royal Commission was about to start and the police retreated inside
themselves knowing that the judicial system considered them easy targets.
The police did not want to get hurt or attract Internal Affairs
complaints.
Call me stupid, call me a dinosaur, but I made sure that day that at
least one person in the group that threw the brick was arrested. I began
by approaching the group just as that magistrate had lectured me and the
other police involved in the Croydon search warrant. I simply asked who
threw the brick. I was greeted with abuse and threats. I then reverted to
the old ways of policing. I grabbed the nearest male and convinced him
that it was he who had thrown the brick. His brave mates did nothing. By
the time we arrived at the police station, this young fool had become
compliant, apologetic and so afraid that he kept crying.
You may not agree with what I did, but I paraded this goose around the
police station for all the young police to see what they had become
frightened of. For some months after that, police routinely rounded up the
family whenever it was warranted.
However, some years later, with a change of Police Commander and the
advent of duty officers under Peter Ryan, the family got back on top and
within months had murdered a young Australian man who had wandered into
their area drunk. They had set up a caravan where they sold drugs
twenty-four hours a day. They tied up half the police station with
Internal Affairs complaints ranging from the sublime to the ridiculous,
but under Peter Ryan, these complaints were always treated seriously.
In effect, this family had taken control of Redfern. Senior police did
their best to limit police action against them, fearing an avalanche of IA
complaints that would count against the Commander at Peter Ryan’s next
Op Crime Review.
I hope the examples I have just used don’t give the impression that I
am a racist or a bully. The point I want to make from the start is that
policing has never been rocket science. It is about human dynamics, street
psychology, experience, a little bit of theatre and a substantial quantity
of common sense. Sure, forensics and the advances of DNA, rapid
fingerprint identification and electronic eavesdropping have taken
policing to a new level of sophistication, but ultimately, when an
offender is identified by whatever means, scientific or otherwise, it all
comes down to the interaction between the investigator and the offender
during the arrest and interview process. Violent and abusive offenders do
not respect the law or those who enforce it. But they do respect the
old-style cop who doesn’t take a backward step and can’t be
intimidated. When they encounter cops like that, they fold quickly —
there is rarely much behind the veneer of bravado.
In 1996 with the arrival of Peter Ryan, and the continued public
humiliation of the New South Wales Police through the Wood Royal
Commission, a chain of events began that have affected the police so
deeply and so completely that, as far as ensuring community safety is
concerned, I fear it will take at least a generation to regain the lost
ground.
IT WAS ABOUT 1995 to 1996 that the emergence of Middle Eastern crime
groups was first observed in New South Wales. Before then they had been
largely known for individual acts of anti-social behaviour and loose
family structures involved in heroin importation and supply as well as
motor vehicle theft and conversion. The one crime that did appear
organised before this period was insurance fraud, usually motor vehicle
accidents and arson. Because these crimes were largely victimless, they
were dealt with by insurance companies and police involvement was limited.
But from these insurance scams, a generation of young criminals emerged to
become engaged in more sophisticated crimes, such as extortion, armed
robbery, organised narcotics importation and supply, gun running,
organised factory and warehouse break-ins, car theft and conversion on a
massive scale including the exporting of stolen luxury vehicles to Lebanon
and other Middle Eastern countries.
As the police began to gather and act on intelligence on these emerging
Middle Eastern gangs the first of the series of events took place. The New
South Wales Police was restructured under Peter Ryan. Crime Intelligence,
the eyes and ears of all police forces throughout the world, was
dismantled overnight and a British-style intelligence unit was created.
The formation of this unit and its functions has been best described by Dr
Richard Basham — as a library stocking outdated books. The new Crime
Intelligence and Information Section became completely reactive. It
received crime intelligence from the field and stored it. Almost no
relevant intelligence was ever dispensed to operational police from 1997
until I left in 2002. It was a disgrace.
One of the fundamental problems that arose out of the new intelligence
structure was that it no longer had a field capacity or a target
development capacity. With the old BCI there were field teams that were
assigned to look into emerging trends. Vietnamese, Romanian and Hong Kong
Chinese groups were all targeted after intelligence grew on their
activities. When the alarm bells went off over growing intelligence
concerns about a new or current crime group, covert operations were
mounted.
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