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Mullahs' Threat Not Sinking In
Alan Peters
2005/11/12
Indications of radical changes in the dynamics of the
3-month-old Iranian government, politically, philosophically and in their
potential to do irreparable global damage without flinching or concern has
begun sending shivers down some analysts' spines. However, this has yet to
reach policy decision makers or the mass media.
Iran's Supreme Ruler, "ayatollah"
Ali Khamenei's hasty revisions of the national ruling structure, delegating
some of his own authority to the Expediency Council, chaired by rival
"ayatollah" and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, reflects
unusual action to counter-balance the power-grab by newly inaugurated
President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad.
The unannounced moratorium on policies and procedures
of all Iran's government ministries has been equally attributed to Rafsanjani's
efforts to take control of Judicial, Legislative and Executive bodies
through the broadened Expediency Council powers - and to Ahmadi-Nejad's cabinet
implementing new regulations that suit their views. Specially, after warnings to
the Expediency Council from his hard-line allies in the Majliss (parliament),
not to mess with the Legislative system.
Persistent reports emanating from Tehran of solid rocket
fuel capability and long range Shahab-3 missile tests, with emptied North Korean
designed nuclear warheads, providing serious concerns, the nuclear component
has begun taking second place to Iran's ability, even unintended, to damage
global economies resulting (in worst-case scenarios) in worldwide financial
meltdowns.
The 27-year, overtly hostile but comparatively "reasoned" approach
toward the Western world and foreigners by the previous generation of senior
Iranian Mullahs, with their accumulated overseas personal financial interests
– even overflowing bank accounts outside Iran, has clearly ended. This
has yet to permeate onto the desks of leaders in the Western world. READ
MORE
Analysis and evaluation based on prior status quo and
parameters, with some adjustment for new players – as was the case with
former changes of President and Majliss (parliament) deputies – no longer
holds water. Any more than understandable, logical evaluations had a
place with genocidal, paranoid Pol Pot of
Cambodia
.
Greater and lesser indicators mentioned below of
mindsets, policies and philosophy, show "C" note changes, particularly
to SME's (subject matter experts) on what drives "neo-Iran".
OVERVIEW
Less than three months ago, on August 15, 2005,
Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad took office as the new "selected" President
of the Islamic Republic of Iran with huge doubts over validity of the elections.
- He immediately purged
nearly all senior governing positions of older generation clerics and
officials and replaced them with his military colleagues of the elite
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – about 350,000 strong, in
which, prior to becoming Mayor of Tehran, he had been a commander.
- His neo-Islamic Republic,
harking back to Khomeini times, has instructed all airports and domestic
or international airlines operating in
Iran
to remove all foreign words or characters from their signs at ground
locations across the country. In the same vein, clothing designers,
hired for this purpose, have started creating a national Islamic style
for everyone to wear. Strict imposition of restrictions on movies and
audio, allowed to lapse to some extent by the previous President
Mohammad Khatami, has been re-instated.
- Bassiji paramilitary
(anti-demonstration and Islamic enforcement strike forces) have had their
authority widely expanded to suppress dissent without any restraints and
for the past month, Revolutionary Guards have begun appearing at posts on
street corners and in a highly increased number of patrols. (Still
unclear was the showing up of only 1,400 Bassijis at an event when 20,000
should have appeared, though they have continued attacking students and
by-standers with knives and clubs with their customary brutality).
- Residents of
Tehran
and its outer suburbs of late witnessed unannounced military exercises that
involved the use of live munitions and firepower – and on an almost
nightly basis in the hills East of Tehran. Officials have tried to explain
such activity as an eradication of communities and townships around
Tehran
, populated by criminal elements fleeing justice and becoming a threat to
national security.
- Brigadier-General
Mohammad Kossari, head of the Security Bureau of the IRGC stated,
"
Iran
intends to become a superpower and will drive all
foreign forces out of our region". What was previously sheer
hyperbole now has a basis in serious executive policy and planning in
Iran
's new government.
- Hassan Abbasi, Head
the Center for Security Doctrines Research of the IRGC has become
Ahmadi-Nejad's prime advisor on Foreign Affairs. He lately announced, "We
have a strategy drawn up for the destruction of Anglo-Saxon civilization".
(An attitude supported by the tenets of Hojatieh - see below).
- Ahmadi-Nejad has declared
a plan to create an Oil Bourse (Exchange) in Iran to unlink oil
pricing from the U.S. Dollar and use the Euro or barter instead, thus
to break any grip the West and the Dollar have on oil supplies or trade
and make Iran the top oil and natural gas broker within the region.
(Unlikely to succeed but perhaps effective enough on a short-term basis to
trigger a dollar crash which could destabilize global solvency).
- Having studied Urban
Development at the
University
of
Science
in
Tehran
, Ahmadi-Nejad has started drawing up plans to relocate 25 million rural
residents to existing urban centers to facilitate less costly provision
of utilities and services. (Grandiose Stalinist or Hitlerian methods,
exhibiting simplistic disregard of unintended consequences and social side
effects).
- After his inauguration, Ahmadi-Nejad
visited the grave of his hero, Ayatollah Rouhallah (soul of Allah) Khomeini then
went to kiss the hand of his mentor and spiritual guide, Ayatollah Mesbah
Yazdi, leader of the Hojatieh sect of Islam, who was instrumental
in elevating Ahmadi-Nejad to his Presidential position.
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