many years at FFI we have been saying that the Islamic terrorists are incorrigible.
They are motivated by an ideology and as long as this ideology is not
defeated they will continue being terrorists and more will join them.
There are three ways to get rid of Islamic terrorism.
Lock dedicated Muslims by millions or perhaps hundreds of millions and
throw the key in the sea.
Kill them. But of course you have to kill them all because if you kill
some, others will retaliate. So be ready to nuke a billion Muslims.
Tell them the truth and wean them from Islam. By telling them the truth, I
mean "force feeding" them the truth. This is the way they and
their ancestors converted to Islam in the first place and this is the way
to wean them from it also. This is much easier than you think. All you
have to do is defeat the political correctness and demand Muslims to
answer for the evil teachings of the Quran and the evil deeds of their
prophet. If they receive no moral support from the useful idiots, they
will leave Islam.
The world is not willing to consider the option c
because it is not politically correct. So the problem of Islamic terrorism
will only increase and unfortunately option b becomes the only viable and
inevitable choice. There is only one way to describe this and that is STUPID.
Here is the article by Newsweek.
a Terrorist, Always a Terrorist?’
A top Canadian intelligence official says
there’s little hope of rehabilitating suspected Islamic terrorists.
2006 - When is it safe to release a captured Islamic terrorist from
prison or detention? According to a top official of Canada’s
intelligence service, the answer is: never.
testimony at a court hearing in Ottawa last November, which got no
attention south of the border, the senior Middle East analyst for the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), identified only as “P.G.,”
declared his agency’s “belief” that people who have joined
militant “networks” linked to Al Qaeda and affiliated Islamic
movements “maintain their ties, and their relationships to those
networks, for very long periods of time. These ties are forged in
environments where relationships mean a great deal, and it is our belief
that the dedication to the ideology, if you will, is very strong, and is
virtually impossible to break.”
official paper that he drafted outlining the service’s position on the
release of alleged jihadi detainees held by the Canadian government
under a controversial post-9/11 security procedure, P.G. wrote that
“Individuals who have attended terrorist training camps or who have
independently opted for radical Islam must be considered threats to
Canadian public safety for the indefinite future. It is highly unlikely
that they will cast off their views on jihad and the justification for
the use of violence.” The paper adds that “Incarceration is
certainly not a guarantee that the extremist will soften his or her
attitudes over time; quite the contrary. The Service assesses that
extremists will rejoin their networks upon release.”
section of the paper carrying the subhead “Once a Terrorist, Always a
Terrorist?”, P.G. noted “there have already been instances where
released detainees have rejoined extremist groups … At least 10
detainees released from the Guantanamo Bay prison after U.S. officials
concluded they posed little threat have been recaptured or killed
fighting U.S. or coalition forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and one
of the repatriated prisoners is still at large after taking leadership
of a militant faction in Pakistan and aligning himself with Al Qaeda.”
paper cites several well-known cases as evidence that Islamic militants
are likely to maintain, and even intensify, their extremist views and
violent tendencies as a result of imprisonment. In one case, Allekema
Lamari, an Algerian “extremist,” was released from a Spanish prison
only to later mastermind the deadly March 11, 2004, bombing attacks on
Madrid commuter trains. Then there are the cases of Ayman al-Zawahiri,
who, the paper, says spent three years in an Egyptian prison for his
involvement in the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, only to
emerge as Osama bin Laden’s principal deputy, and Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi,
the militant who spent seven years in prison in his native Jordan for
extremist activities, only to emerge as self-proclaimed creator and
leader of Al Qaeda’s ultraviolent affiliate in post-Saddam Iraq. The
CSIS paper also pointedly notes that after serving half of an eight-year
terrorism-related sentence in a French prison, Algerian
Islamic militant Fateh Kamel returned to Canada; Kamel, the
document says, once boasted: “Killing is easy for me.”