Islamic Violence: Socio-Economic Phenomena or Faith Motivated

 

Islamic
Violence:

Socio-Economic
Phenomenon or Faith Motivated?

 

 

Introduction

Islam
came under the public spotlight, more than ever before, in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the USA. It was examined to discern
if and why it allowed nineteen Muslims to commit suicide and kill
three thousand others in doing so. Some commentators wrote of Islamic
militancy and defined Islam and Muslims as a philosophy and people
distinct from secular and pluralistic Western norms. Others rushed to
defend it from the actions of a few. In any case, the events of
September 11 brought nascent rumblings against Islam to a head and
placed it squarely centre stage in the on-going animosity between
Muslim and non-Muslim societies, a situation which has continued
since Islam first evolved. With the influx of Muslim immigrants into
the West, the “Muslim question” has acquired an immediacy not
known since the Turks stormed the gates of Vienna. The apocryphal man
in the streets of London, New York, Paris, Amsterdam, Madrid and
elsewhere in the Western world has, for one reason or another, formed
a mental nexus between Islam and violence. Some academics, Muslim and
non-Muslim alike, seeing this linkage being formed, ascribe various
factors to explain the rise of Islamic militancy. They claim that
Islam is a tool used by some influential individuals to further their
political agendas. Others claim that it is not Islam which is to
blame; it is the underlying social, political and economic repression
felt in the Arab world on a daily basis which, added to the perceived
loss of self-esteem on the world stage, fuels Islamic militancy.

 

However,
as this paper will demonstrate, while social and economic repression
does indeed exist in most Muslim-majority nations, Islam as a
religion and ideology is the primary motivator of Islamic violence
and is more to blame than any repressive socio-economic factors. This
paper will examine some of the arguments put forward by Muslim and
non-Muslim apologists and demonstrate that these arguments are, for
the most part, invalid. In so doing, it will demonstrate that Islamic
teachings are more to blame for Islamic violence, more than any other
alleged source.

 

 

On the One Hand…

Some
academics highlight the differences between Islam and the West. In
his book, “The Clash of
Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order”,
Huntington ascribes five main reasons – a booming population
resulting in large-scale unemployment, the Islamic resurgence,
Western efforts to impose its values, institutions and economic
superiority, the collapse of Communism, and increasing contact
between Westerners and Muslims due to globalisation – for the
conflict between Islam and the West. He also notes that Islam has
“bloody borders”, i.e. there is conflict where it conjoins other
civilisations. In short, the perception that Islam is warlike and
distinct from the pluralistic and secular West does exist.

 

While
not denying Huntington’s observations, Esposito posits four
phenomena common to the present Muslim experience. These are

(1) an identity crisis precipitated by a
sense of failure, loss of identity and lack of self-esteem, (2)
disillusionment with the West, the failure of many Muslim rulers and
their Western-inspired governments to respond adequately to the
political and socio-economic needs of their societies, (3) the
newfound sense of pride and power that resulted from military
(Arab-Israeli war) and economic (oil embargo) success in 1973 and the
Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 and (4) a quest for a more authentic
identity rooted in an Islamic past (Esposito, 1998).

 

Kidron
and Segal confirm Esposito’s observations of the economic situation
in Muslim-majority states. Their research shows fifteen of nineteen
countries that will never be self-sufficient in food production are
Muslim-majority states. Also, seven of the twelve countries with the
lowest record of life-expectancy (under 45 years) are Muslim-majority
states (Kidron & Segal, 1991). Not much appears to have improved
since their observations in 1991. Lewis provides more of the same
statistics regarding the economic situation in Islamic nations. He
notes,

In the listing of economies by gross
domestic product, the highest ranking Muslim-majority country is
Turkey, with 64 million inhabitants, in twenty-third place, between
Austria and Denmark with about 5 million each. The next is Indonesia,
with two hundred and twelve million, in twenty-eighth place,
following Norway with 4.5 million and followed by Saudi Arabia with
21 million (Lewis, 2003, p.88).

Lewis
also notes that in terms of life expectancy and in a human
development index, the first Muslim-majority state ranks
thirty-second.

 

The
political situation in these states is hardly any better. In its
“Special Report on The World’s Most Repressive Regimes to the
59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights” in
2003, Freedom House notes that five of the seven most repressive
regimes are Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Morocco. In Saudi
Arabia, for example, no elections are held, the king rules by decree
in accordance with Islamic law, and Saudis have little protection
from arbitrary arrest, prolonged pre-trial detention and torture by
security forces. The judiciary is subject to the government – in
effect, the House of Saud. Freedom of expression is extremely
restricted, with criticism of the royal family, government or Islam
prohibited. The Sauds own all broadcast media and closely monitor all
privately owned (though publicly financed) publications. Public
demonstrations for political issues are completely banned. Trade
unions, collective bargaining and strikes are prohibited (Freedom
House, 2003). The situation is not much different in the other four
nations.

Kidron
and Segal assert that twenty nine of thirty two Muslim-majority
nations are “terror states”, i.e. states which use assassination
and torture on their own populations (Kidron & Segal, 1991).
Levitt adds, “Political terrorism, often sponsored by states, has
long been a major factor in Middle East politics. Terrorist groups’
ability to act more frequently and effectively is closely linked to
[governmental] financing” (Levitt, 2002, p. 127).

 

On
another issue, up-to-date statistics on women’s issues are not
readily available due to a lack of reporting. However, Kidron and
Segal note that,

[S]eventeen of the twenty three countries
with the worst records of jobs for women (i.e. where women make up
only 10% – 20% of all workers) are Muslim-majority. Similarly, ten of
the eleven worst offenders of opportunity between men and women are
Muslim-majority states. Again, seven of the twelve states with the
worst records for unequal treatment of girls are Muslim-majority
states (Kidron & Segal, 1991).

 

On
the literacy front, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
report on Arab Human Development, published in 2002, and prepared by
Arab intellectuals notes,

The Arab world translates about 330 books
annually, one fifth of the number that Greece translates. The
accumulative total of translated books since the Caliph Maa’moun’s
time [the ninth century CE] is about 100,000, almost the average that
Spain translates in one year (UNDP, 2002).

 

Additionally,
the report notes that the average per capita income growth during the
preceding two decades years in the Arab world was only one-half of 1%
per annum, worse than anywhere but sub-Saharan Africa, that one in
five Arabs lives on less than two dollars per day; that fifteen
percent of the Arab workforce is unemployed, and this number could
double by 2010; that only 1% of the population has a personal
computer, and only one-half of 1% use the Internet and, perhaps most
tellingly, a full half of Arab women cannot read. Interestingly,
fertility rates remain high where traditional values, especially
illiteracy, obtain. But where literacy increases they plummet to
levels comparable to the West. As Longman observes,

No single aspect of modernisation can
account for the decline in population growth rates, but the literacy
rate alone explains most of the difference in fertility rates in
Muslim countries. Among the 34 largest Arab countries, just one
factor, namely the difference in literacy rates, explains 60% of the
difference in the population growth rate in 2005 (Longman, 2004, p.
103).

 

For
example, Somalia, with 25% adult literacy, has a population growth of
4% per annum. In Algeria, where 62% of adults are literate, the
growth rate is 1.4% per annum. Qatar, with a literacy rate close to
80%, has a population growth rate of 1.2% (Longman, 2004). In short,
he notes, “Faith is increasingly necessary as a motivation to have
children” (Longman, 2004, p.107)¹.

 

Too,
there is deep discontent and frustration in Muslim countries. As
Ghadbian states,

“Political authoritarianism, economic
crisis and social anomie have been the dominant realities in the Arab
world over the last three decades, despite variations among
countries. … [B]oth traditional and progressive regimes continue to
justify authoritarianism … [A]fter nearly four decades of
authoritarian rule, Islamist groups took up the banner of popular
resistance … recruiting their cadres from the young, students,
low-level white collar workers, and the unemployed. … Authoritarian
political environments, coupled with economic hardship and political
anomie are characteristics of contexts that engender violent groups.
The more intense the perception of the discrepancy between
aspirations and social conditions, the greater the potential for
political violence – in systems where non-violent means of
political participation are narrow to nonexistent” (Ghadbian,
2002).

 

Adding
to the sense of frustration, Lewis notes,

“The Muslim has suffered successive
stages of defeat. The first was his loss of domination in the world
to the advancing power of Russia and the West. The second was the
undermining of his authority in his own country through an invasion
of foreign ideas and laws and ways of life … The third – the last
straw – was the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from
emancipated women and rebellious children. It was too much to endure
…” (Lewis, 1990).

 

Lewis
also explains that various Islamic regimes were so contemptuous of
Europeans because of their sense of superiority based upon past
Arabic accomplishments, they failed to see that they were being
overtaken in technology and science. By the time the caliphs and
sultans realised that, the parts of the world they had long dominated
had been snatched from under their noses. According to Lewis, this
was seen as “a reversal of both natural and divine law” (Lewis,
1990, p. 4).

 

Given
their economic, political and social hardships, it is hardly
surprising that disaffected Arabs turn to Islam, their primary
commonality. This leads to a “sense of shared identity and fate
among Muslims [which] is coupled with a Muslim perception that the
non-Muslim world is equally undifferentiated – and united against
Islam” (Simon, 2005, p. 14). Simon continues,

The Arab Middle East has disengaged from
the world economy, even as its population continues to grow. Regional
unemployment, on average, is about 25 per cent and won’t improve
for years. Populations are burdened by authoritarian, corrupt
governments and inefficient, stifling bureaucracies. Muslims are
embroiled in violent conflict from Chechnya to Palestine to Kashmir,
while Muslim rulers in the region are seen to be doing nothing but
enriching themselves. For years, the only place to register dissent
was the mosque (Simon, 2005, p. 16).

 

Lewis
adds to that,

… Dictators can forbid parties, they
can forbid meetings – they cannot forbid public worship, and they
can to only a limited extent control sermons (Lewis, 2003, p. 116).

 

This
situation, and the view that modernisation and Western values have
not eased their hardships, is perhaps a key reason for a growing
tendency to look back to the golden age of Islam. As Lewis observes,
many Muslims yearn for a return to the times of the caliphs, when
Islam was “the leading civilisation in the world, marked as such by
its great and powerful kingdoms, its rich and varied industry and
commerce, its original and creative science and letters” (Lewis,
2003, p. 117). This is wholly in keeping with Esposito’s position
on a Muslim search for identity in Islam’s past.

 

From
this perspective, the argument that radical Islam is a cry of despair
for the decline of Islamic civilisation, with declining population
growth rates and the erosion of traditional values in the face of
globalisation, is cogent. However, as Kenneth Pollack observed in
reviewing Lewis’s work,

Lewis still has not grappled with the
deeper questions for his readers. He still has not offered his
explanation for why the Islamic Middle East stagnated, why its
efforts at reform failed, why it is notably failing to become
integrated into the global economy in a meaningful way and why these
failures have produced not a renewed determination to succeed … but
an anger and frustration with the West so pervasive and vitriolic
that it has bred murderous, suicidal terrorism despite all of the
Islamic prohibitions against such an action (Pollack, 2003)².

 

The
last remaining of the four phenomena posited by Esposito is that of
warfare between Arab nations and Israel, encompassing the Palestinian
issue. The Six Day War between Israel and the combined forces of
Egypt, Jordan and Syria in 1967 led to an Arab rout and loss of
territory. This “raised serious questions about the force of Arab
regimes and their nationalist policies, in particular Nasser’s Arab
nationalism/socialism. Most important, the loss of Jerusalem … and
its sacred shrines was a major blow to Muslim pride and faith,
precipitating a crisis of confidence and identity” (Esposito, 1998,
p.161). This thinking soon took religious overtones.

If Islamic belief and history taught
success and power were the signs of a faithful community, many again
asked, “What has gone wrong in Islam? Why has God seemingly
abandoned His community?” … Massive failure could only be a sign
of waywardness and faithlessness. Coping with modernity did not
require new, foreign-inspired alternatives when the community (umma)
had a tried and true faith and way of life (Esposito, 1998, p. 162).

 

Esposito
notes, additionally, that the Israeli movement of its capital, after
the shameful defeat of the Arab forces, to Jerusalem demonstrated to
the Arab world its military inability and the fact that the West was
decidedly an ally of Israel.

 

The
Egypt-Israel War of 1973 was seen by many Arabs as vindication of
their 1967 losses. Sadat used Islamic symbols and rhetoric to
motivate his forces, giving the encounter distinctly religious
overtones. Thus, though the Israelis were victorious, the Arab
forces’ initial victories were seen as a victory for Islam. The
commonality was religion – Islam. Later, the defeat of the Soviet
military in Afghanistan in the 1980s demonstrated to the Arab world
that a united Muslim force could defeat a “Western Power”. Unger
expands on this:

Thousands of young warriors calling
themselves Afghan Arabs streamed out of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen,
and all over the Middle East to aid the Mujahideen. … They were
motivated by religious fervour and passion. This was a people’s
war, a noble crusade against an infidel superpower that had invaded
Muslim lands, a fight to avenge the martyrdom of their Afghan
brothers being crushed by Moscow. It was time to demonstrate faith
and courage. For many Muslims, the liberation of Afghanistan became a
very personal jihad (Unger, 2004, p. 99).

 

Consequently,
Muslims began to believe that any antagonist could be defeated if
they combined under that one common factor – religion. From that
point it was a very short step to viewing all conflicts in terms of
them (non-Muslims) and us (Muslims). The Iraq War of 1991 further
fuelled resentment of the West and its perceived collusion with Arab
rulers. The West was viewed as supporting regimes which were
antithetical to Islam or its followers. As Hutchison narrates,

“The animosity between Islam and the
West is a matter of fact,” a Saudi engineer working on the oil
clean-up told me. “Many of us feel it was wrong for the king to
have asked the West to defend us. More and more we are convinced that
the Gulf War was a Western plot to install a permanent military
presence in Saudi Arabia.”

…

“But then we ask ourselves, with all
the money that our government spends on armaments – $16 billion last
year – why do we need the Americans to protect us from Iraq? Many
friends in the university feel that King Fahd has allowed Islam’s
holy land to be defiled by foreign troops,” he said (Hutchison,
1998, p. 384).

 

With
this new-found sense of commonality and brotherhood under the banner
of Islam, Muslims became increasingly militant, seeing themselves as
being at least equal, if not superior to, non-Muslims in terms of
battle, war and dying. Apart from military action, however, the Arab
oil embargo of 1973 was a key factor in re-establishing perceptions
of Arab equality with, if not superiority to, the West. Esposito
notes, “For the first time since the dawn of colonialism, the West
seemed dependent on the Arab world. The Arab states were no longer
client states but a world economic power to be reckoned with.
Importantly, for many in the Arab world the embargo was a source of
pride and a sign of the return of God’s blessings” (Esposito,
1998, p. 163).

 

Then
came Khomeini with his audio-taped messages to the Iranian people.
The 1979 Iranian revolution marked a watershed in Islamic resurgence.
In that year the US-backed Shah was deposed and Ruhollah Khomeini, a
Shi’ite Ayatollah, installed as the ultimate head of Iran. The
Iranian revolution had distinct religious overtones and embodied
claims that “a return to Islam would restore Islamic identity and
vitality and enable all Muslims, with God’s guidance, to implement
a more autonomous and self-reliant way of life despite a regime’s
military power and Western allies” (Esposito, 1998, p. 163).

 

Also
in 1979, extremists took control of the mosque in Mecca. Saudi forces
reclaimed it only after the loss of over two hundred personnel and
much prestige, having to rely on French troops to regain control of
the mosque. The Saudis consequently reached an accommodation with the
Wahhabi sect,

… not only to accept their views about
propriety, pious behaviour, and Islamic law, but effectively to turn
over education in the Kingdom to them and later to fund the expansion
into Pakistan and elsewhere of their extreme, hostile, anti-modern,
and anti-infidel form of Islam. As a result, this Wahhabi sect, which
would have been regarded as recently as fifty years ago as an
austere, fringe group by a large majority of Muslims, is now
extremely powerful and influential in the Muslim world due to Saudi
government support and the oil wealth of the Arabian peninsula
(Centre for Religious Freedom, 2005)

 

Militant
groups have used the Iranian revolution as a model to establish
Islam-oriented political systems in the Middle East, giving rise to
the Western notion that Islam alone was the motive force behind them.
This view was soon accepted throughout the Western world where state
and religion are demarcated. This in turn gave rise to the notion
that all Muslim states are inexorably bound by Islamic law and,
inevitably, further distanced Muslims and Islam from the West.

 

 

On
the Other…

These
factors aside, Islam itself must be examined as a cause of militancy.
Many Muslims believe that Islam means “peace”. This is not quite
accurate. While some verses of the Quran preach peace, the word
itself means “submission to the will of God” (Spencer, 2002). In
what can only be seen as an attempt to placate Muslim sentiment in
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York in 2001, George
Bush stated that the attacks “violate the fundamental tenets of the
Islamic faith” (Bush, 2001). Tony Blair in London and John Howard
of Australia mouthed similar platitudes, leading Heitmeyer to comment
that Western political leadership “collectively appears to have
acquired an instant postgraduate degree in Islamic studies, enabling
them to lecture the population concerning the true nature of Islam”
(cited in Benard, 2003). Scholars too sought to distance Islam from
violence. Karen Armstrong tried to remove the Islamic aspect from the
9-11 attacks, declaring,

Constantly the Quran (the Islamic Holy
Book) points out that Mohammed (the Islamic Prophet) had not come to
cancel [Judaism or Christianity], to contradict their prophets or to
start a new faith. His message is the same as that of Abraham, Moses,
David, Solomon or Jesus (Armstrong, 2000).

 

Unfortunately
for Ms Armstrong, this assertion is theologically debatable. Put
simply, Muslims believe that Jesus of Nazareth was a prophet and no
more while Christians believe he was god incarnate and worship him as
such. This one fact by itself demonstrates the vast gulf between the
two faiths and gives the lie to the claims of many Muslims and
commentators like Armstrong that the two religions profess the same
god. Moreover, as we will see, while Jesus commanded Peter to put
away his sword in the Garden of Gethsemane, Muhammad used force to
further his religion.

 

One
of the major issues with Islam is that it does not have a hierarchy
similar to, for instance, the Church of Rome. It has no single
spokesperson or formally appointed official to interpret scripture.
This leaves the meanings of Quranic verses open to debate and
interpretation (ijtihad).
Some guidelines to interpretation exist, but these are ambiguous and
permit circumstantial interpretation. In practice, therefore, many
preachers tend towards extreme views. Simon sums the situation up
succinctly. “The splintering of religious authority … has enabled
radicals and self-appointed clerics to control the way scripture is
applied to modern day problems as both explanation and prescription”
(Simon, 2005, p. 18). This begs the often-asked question, “Who
speaks for Islam?” As a consequence of interpretation and emphasis,
the so-called “Sword Verses”, those which decree warfare against
non-Muslims, are emphasised by militant Islamists with the “moderate”
Muslim retort being notably absent.

 

There
is another argument put forward by apologists, who seek to remove
Islamic theology from the terrorism equation, which must be put to
rest. Recently, the word “jihad” has been described as meaning
“to strive” and not necessarily as “religious war”. This,
too, is debatable. Benjamin and Simon note,

Ibn Taimiyya would not have recognised
the modern day distinction between “greater jihad”, the struggle
for spiritual excellence and “lesser jihad”, the waging of war
against Islam’s enemies. … Along with his contemporaries he
considered the superior form of jihad to be combat against infidels.
Spiritual jihad was important as preparation for the more physically
demanding kind of jihad. This classical emphasis of jihad as warfare
has been adopted enthusiastically by contemporary militants who
reject more recent Sufic and Apologetic assertions that spiritual
jihad is the authentic jihad.

The last century has seen a trend toward
interpretation of the so-called greater jihad as the more genuine
form of Islamic struggle. The term comes from a hadith of disputed
reliability in which Muhammad is reported to have said, upon
returning from battle, that he has now returned from the lesser jihad
to the greater, spiritual jihad (Benjamin & Simon, 2002, p. 55).

 

Lewis
goes further, writing,

…the presumption is that the duty of
jihad will continue, interrupted only by truces, until all the world
either adopts the Muslim faith or submits to Muslim rule (Lewis,
2003, p.32).

 

Moreover,
it is simply wrong to assume that fighting is only permitted in the
defence of Islam. Jamal Badawi, a Muslim apologist, says, “Actual
armed jihad is permissible under two conditions alone: one is for
self-defence, and the other is for fighting against oppression”
(cited in Eck, 2001). Although correct, this explanation is
incomplete. “Self-defence” and “oppression” are defined in
broader terms by Islam than the West. Islam decrees that a nation’s
leaders are “oppressors” if they do not acknowledge sharia, and
are “a legitimate target for war” (Kelsay, 1993). Consequently,
America is perceived as a cultural aggressor for exporting its
“Hollywood values”, which are generally seen as being
antithetical to Islam, so any fight against it is perceived as
self-defence (Galli, 2001).

 

It
has been argued by Muslim apologists and others that the Qur’an
enjoins Muslims not to attack first (Qur’an 2:190). However, given
the long history of violence between Islam and Christianity, for one,
virtually every Muslim attack is presaged with implied statements
that “They attacked us first.” By this Muslims refer to the
alleged actions of Jews against Mohammad. However, given the
vitriolic nature of the Qur’an when it speaks of non-Muslims
(including Christians and Jews), it is the “moderate” Muslims who
are left with the task of splitting hairs to explain why the “People
of the Book” are now being attacked. They are forced to bring
Mohammad’s precedent in attacking Jews to prove the validity of
their argument. In doing so, however, they are forced to admit that
their prophet was not a man of peace, as was Jesus of Nazareth, but a
war-lord and a political leader. If Mohammed combined politics and
religion it is hardly surprising that the two are closely
inter-related today and difficult to distinguish between. Muslim
leaders, therefore, have no choice but to profess to be Muslims first
and foremost.

 

But
arising from this, what the same apologists speak little about (or
nothing at all) is the subject of Islamic imperialism. Muslims by and
large always refer to Western imperialism when explaining the
motivations for attacks such as 9/11. But the subject of Islamic
imperialism is strictly off limits or never referred to at all. As
Lewis explains,

[The word imperialism] is, for example,
never used by Muslims of the great Muslim empires – the first ones
founded by the Arabs, the latter ones by the Turks, who conquered
vast territories and populations and incorporated them into the House
of Islam (Dar ul Islam). It was perfectly legitimate for Muslims to
conquer and rule Europe and Europeans and thus enable them – but
not compel them – to embrace the true faith. It was a crime and a
sin for Europeans to conquer and rule Muslims and, still worse, try
to lead them astray. (Lewis, 2003, p.55).

 

The
militancy of Islam derives, to a large extent, from the wars fought
by Muhammad and the exhortations in the Quran to fight and to emulate
him. In his book, “The Life
of Muhammad”, Guillaume
describes many acts of extreme violence perpetrated by Muhammad on
his enemies. These examples sanction and justify some of the worst
crimes perpetrated, in turn, by Muslims against non-Muslims. For
example, Durant states unequivocally, “…the Islamic conquest of
India is probably the bloodiest story in history” (Durant, 1993).
Gautier echoes this assertion,

Let it be said right away: the massacres
perpetrated by Muslims in India are unparalleled in history, bigger
than the holocaust of the Jews by the Nazis; or the massacre of the
Armenians by the Turks; more extensive even than the slaughter of the
South American native populations by the invading Spanish and
Portuguese (Gautier, 1996).

 

And
again, this from Alain Danielou:

From the time Muslims started arriving,
the history of India becomes a long, monotonous series of murders,
massacres, spoliations, destructions. It is, as usual, in the name of
‘a holy war’ of their faith, of their sole God, that the
barbarians have destroyed civilisations, wiped out entire races
(Danielou, 1997)

 

It
must be asked, how do Muslims who kill justify their actions?
Invariably, they cite religious sanction. Where, it must be asked,
were the “moderate” Muslims who denounced Khomeini’s fatwa
on Salman Rushdie? Even Western converts to Islam have no
compunctions in adhering to the necessity of killing “apostates”.
Speaking of Rushdie, Cat Stevens, a hippie convert to Islam, saw the
need to kill him because of religious compunction. Endorsing
Khomeini’s fatwa
on his website, Stevens (now Yusuf Islam) says,

Under Islamic Law, the ruling regarding
blasphemy is quite clear; the person found guilty of it must be put
to death. Only under certain circumstances can repentance be
accepted. … The fact is that as far as the application of Islamic
Law and the implementation of full Islamic way of life in Britain is
concerned, Muslims realise that there is very little chance of that
happening in the near future. But that shouldn’t stop us from
trying to improve the situation and presenting the Islamic viewpoint
whenever and wherever possible. That is the duty of every Muslim and
that is what I did (cited in Harris, 2004)³.

 

What
is it, if not Islam, which turns a peaceful hippie who sang in one of
his most famous songs, Peace
Train, “Why can’t we live
and let live?” into an intolerant, bigoted individual who
advocates, or at least justifies, murder? The Qur’an is replete
with admonitions against non-Muslims, speaking of religious conflict
on virtually every page. Given this, it may be prudent for those
apologists who read these admonitions and yet deny the link between
Islam and Islamic violence to consult their nearest psychiatrist.

 

Again,
it is to be noted that many eminent commentators refuse to speak of
Islamic fundamentalism because the “fundamentalists”, who are
usually those who are willing to use force to encourage non-Muslims
to follow their religion of peace, are very different from
“mainstream” Muslims who do not agree with their “fundamentalist”
views. This, too, must be refuted. Ask any Muslim if the Qur’an is
the literal word of their deity and the answer will be a resounding
yes. How, then, does this make the “mainstream” Muslim different
from fundamentalist Christians who say the same of the Bible?
However, in the case of Christianity, we note the “mainstream”
Christians who state that the Bible was inspired by their god. Where
are the “mainstream” Muslims who would make that claim of the
Qur’an? Moreover, if the Qur’an is indeed the literal word of
God, then it stands to reason that all Muslims must, in Mohammad’s
words, “wage war against people until they say that there is no god
but Allah…”
(http://islamicweb.com/beliefs/fiqh/alalwani_usulalfiqh/ch2.htm).

 

As
Ruthven, writing about Mohammed, notes, “The prophet had been his
own Caesar … If imitato
Christi meant renouncing
worldly ambition and seeking salvation by deeds of private virtue,
imitato Muhammadi
meant sooner or later taking up arms against those forces which
seemed to threaten Islam from within or without” (Ruthven, p. 7).

 

It
is a matter of course for the average Muslim reading the foregoing to
state that the Qur’an admonishes Muslims not to force Islam upon
others – “There shall be no compulsion in Islam (Qur’an 2:256).
To employ another term Muslims like to use as often as they can,
Muslims must tolerate
others. However, this “tolerance” only applies to Christians and
Jews, not Hindus, Buddhists, Animists, Atheists, or other “pagans”
and “idolaters”. But then, even the Christians and Jews must pay
the jizya tax to Muslim authorities. It is easy enough to see why
that average Muslim may use this argument. What is not as clear is
why an acknowledged expert commentator like Fareed Zakaria does, not
unless we consider the fact that all Muslims must prove a blind
loyalty to their creed and prophet despite what historical evidence
demonstrates. He notes that Jews had a much easier life under Islamic
rule than under Christian (Zakaria, 2003, p. 126). While this may be
true, it is a comparison in relativity. There are two points to be
made here. Firstly, what Zakaria does not dwell too long upon is the
fact that he too is forced to compare the actions of Islam’s
followers with those of Christianity’s. He probably does not wish
to face the fact that the Christian authorities who persecuted the
Jews did so against the specific teachings of the Bible, whereas the
Muslim authorities did so in compliance with the Qur’an. Secondly,
and despite Zakaria’s views to the contrary, life for Jews under
Islamic rule consisted of humiliation and persecution. Under Islamic
rule, Jews could not bear arms, give evidence in court or ride
horses. They were forced to wear yellow badges (which Hitler copied)
and to keep away from certain streets and buildings. They could only
pass Muslims on their left (this being associated with the Muslim act
of ritually cleansing oneself using only the left hand), and had to
keep their eyes lowered while doing so. In some parts of the Muslim
world it was customary for Muslim children to throw stones at Jews
and spit upon them (Dershowitz, 2003, p. 61).

 

If
that was not bad enough, Jews suffered pogroms under Islamic rule
which continued into the second half of the last century. For the
sake of brevity only some of those which occurred in the twentieth
century are listed: Algeria (1934), Egypt (1919, 1921, 1924, 1938-39,
1945, 1948, 1949, 1967), Iran (1910), Iraq (1936, 1937, 1941, 1946,
1948, 1967, 1969), Morocco (1903, 1912, 1948, 1952, 1955), Palestine
(1929, 1936), Syria (1945, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1967), Yemen (1947)
(Wistrich, 1991).

 

This
alone puts Zakaria’s argument to rest. Nevertheless, he goes on to
state that Muslims living in present-day Western nations are
generally tolerant of the beliefs of others. Again, Mr Zakaria
appears to be myopic. He, perhaps, fails to see the violence
perpetrated by Muslims in Europe, North America and Australia – all
in the name of their religion. But then again, isn’t it necessary
for a minority to appear “tolerant” of the beliefs of the
majority until they are in a position of strength? Is it not
necessary for Muslims to emulate Mohammad who was commanded by the
Islamic god to “wage war against people until they say that there
is no god but Allah”? If so, how can they do so from a position of
weakness? Does it not make sense then to wait until they have grown
strong? The West should not confuse the “tolerance” of a
relatively weak minority for genuine liberalism. Mr Zakaria’s
arguments, in this matter at least, are as simplistic as those of the
“average Muslim”.

 

Another
argument used by this mythical average Muslim is that of the
teachings against suicide. Pollack, in his review of Lewis’s work
(noted previously), referred to Islamic teachings not to commit
suicide. However, he too seems to have exaggerated the number of such
teachings against self-destruction. There appears to be only one
(rather ambiguous) Qur’anic statement, “Do not destroy
yourselves” (Qur’an 4:29). On the contrary, Islam provides every
incentive to commit suicide if it is done for the sake of religion.
In this it is a veritable cult of death. Yes, there are those who
claim that it goes against Islamic teaching to commit suicide.
However, these individuals are in a minority (and if recent Pew polls
are any indication, extremely scarce on the ground). The Muslim
street usually refers to suicide bombings as “sacred explosions”;
in their view the suicide bombers are not sinners but martyrs who
will receive their reward of “rivers of the purest water, and
rivers of milk forever fresh; rivers of wine delectable to those that
drink it and rivers of clearest honey” (Qur’an 47:15). The
suicide bombers will be “attended by boys graced with eternal youth
… arrayed in garments of fine green silk and rich brocade, and
adorned with bracelets of silver” (Qur’an 76:15). It would appear
that the single ambiguous statement against suicide is more than
outweighed by other facets of this religion.

 

One
further Muslim argument often used to justify Islamic violence is to
be examined. Many Muslims, Osama bin Laden included, cite the
Christian Crusades as a major reason for Islamic militancy. It is
true that many horrors were perpetrated by Christian Crusaders upon
Jews and Muslims, but it must be remembered that “the Crusades were
a direct response to Muslim aggression – an attempt to turn back or
defend against Muslim conquests of Christian lands” (Madden, 2005).
Pryce-Jones summarises the situation insightfully. Echoing
Huntington’s notion of “bloody borders”, he states,

The assumption of Muslim superiority and
dhimmi
[non-Muslim, second-class citizenry] inferiority underlay the
rightful order of the Muslim world. In the modern age, however, such
an assumption evidently became absurd. Twin reactions have followed
in the House of Islam: self-pity in finding itself in such
backwardness, and hatred of those thought to be responsible for it.
Inflamed by this mindset, Muslims around the perimeter of the Islamic
world are fighting their neighbours of other religions – Hindus in
India, Communist and Buddhist Chinese, Jews, Christians in a score of
countries, and pagan animists in Africa. In this light, it is wishful
thinking to bracket Islam and peace” (Pryce-Jones, 2002).

 

 

In
short, while Islam speaks of peace at times, the actions of Muhammad
and his followers were far from peaceful, strengthening belief in and
providing the foundation for religiously-sanctioned violence. It is
impossible to distinguish between state and religion under Islam. If
Islamic politics derives from the religion, then it stands to reason
that any action taken by a political entity – a state, government
or other – also stems from that source. This, by extrapolation
therefore, holds true for military actions taken by the state. The
Muslim apologist when faced with this reasoning finds it
uncomfortable to explain Jordan’s massacre of Palestinian Muslim
refugees or Saddam’s actions against Kuwaitis. Consequently, the
apologist has no recourse but to state that Hussein of Jordan and
Saddam were not true Muslims. If these governments were not truly
Muslim it must be asked who were or are. Some short-sighted
individuals at one time would answer, “The Taliban”. In light of
the atrocities committed by the Taliban, however, the response to the
question increasing is “The Caliphs”. Here too, the apologist
stands on shifting sand. As many have stated, the rule of the Caliphs
were anything but golden. In his book, “Islamic Imperialism”,
Karsh makes no bones of the fact that the caliphs had no qualms in
enforcing their religious views upon all and sundry, if necessary by
force. If this is indeed the case, then we must conclude that the
Caliphs were Muslim rulers in name only because the admonition not to
compel Islam upon non-Muslims. But then, if even the Caliphs cannot
be recognised as true Muslims, who do we turn to as an example of a
Muslim who lived in full accord with the tenets of the Qur’an? This
leaves only one individual: Muhammad. At this point the Muslim
apologist appears to be on safe ground, because Muhammad is perceived
by most Muslims as the perfect man. If only it was that simple.

 

A
closer inspection of Muhammad’s life shows anything but a life lead
in accord with the Qur’an. This is amply demonstrated by his
self-defence: “I have been commanded to wage war against people
until they say that there is no god but Allah.” This statement has
several connotations. Firstly, the Islamic god might have decreed on
set of rules in the Qur’an but refuted those because he or she felt
it best for some reason or other. Else, the Qur’an did not apply to
Muhammad. If this is not the case, then the Qur’an is simply wrong
in its command not to compel in religion. To attempt to discern
divine reasoning or to state that the Qur’an is wrong is anathema
to the Muslim. This leaves us with only one conclusion: Muhammad
knowingly rejected his own Qur’anic command. If this is correct,
then Muhammad isn’t a Muslim either. This, as can be imagined,
causes several major theological problems.

 

All
this aside, one simple fact must suffice: the perfect man Muslims are
told to emulate was a warlord and not above using compulsion to
further his own agenda. If the founder of Islam was a violent man,
can the Muslim be anything else but that? No matter the
socio-economic or political difficulties reviewed in the first part
of this paper, it is Islam which must be held responsible for Islamic
violence. Why is it that, despite the hardships faced by Buddhists or
Jains, we do not hear of Buddhist or Jain terrorists? Or Buddhist or
Jain suicide bombers? Why is it that during the course of the Vietnam
War when a Buddhist monk wanted to make a point, he chose self
immolation? On the other hand, witness the carnage brought about by
Muslim suicide bombers. The difference between the Buddhist and the
Muslim is that Islam condones violence. Pure and simple. This is not
something an apologist can deny.

 

 

Conclusion

To
conclude, Huntington is correct in his assessment that Islam has
bloody borders; the religion is responsible to a large extent for
Islamic militancy. Yes, there are underlying economic, social and
political factors in Muslim-majority nations Arab nations which cause
acts of terror by frustrated Muslims. Islamic suicide bombers act out
of desperation to obtain, ironically, a better life. However, as this
paper shows, despite the underlying social and economic causes of
frustration, Islam is in itself militaristic. It condones violence
perpetrated in the name of its God. Other peoples have suffered
indignities, brutalities and repression. The original inhabitants of
Diego Garcia were removed from their island home to make way for an
American base there. When last did we hear of these people becoming
suicide bombers? Or slitting the throats of British or American
citizens? They chose to fight for their cause in various courts of
law, not by flying aircraft filled with innocent travellers into
buildings. The difference lies in Islam. It is Islam which provides
the theological foundation to promote and even sanctify violence.

 

Unfortunately,
this situation will only continue until either the entire world
accepts a specific brand of Islam (choose from Sunni, Shi’a,
Deobandi or other sects) or that religion is changed – from within
or without. Until that happens, Islamic violence will continue
because it is motivated by religious sanction.

 

 

Appendix

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

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Daniel, & Steven Simon, The
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Bush,
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Ghadbian,
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1^
Refer Appendix to see graphs depicting falling
Muslim birth-rates.

 

2^
We will return to
this particular quotation, specifically Pollack’s reference to
Islamic prohibitions against suicide, in the following part of this
paper.

 

3^
It is to be noted
that since making that statement, Yusuf Islam has back-pedalled and
now states he made no such statement, but merely repeated what Islam
demands. His later explanation may be found at
http://www.yusufislam.com/faq/3ed8ab9cb40dcd15dc38b7f0efc2f696/.
Nonetheless,
he did indeed post the statement noted above – as may be evinced
by its very specificity alone – on his website and only later
retracted it.