What is the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism?

Printer-friendly versionSend to friendPDF versionPeter Huessy What is the threat of nuclear terrorism? Is the threat of nuclear terrorism overblown? Are such threats perfectly manageable or have our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged the growth of terrorism and thus enhanced the threat to Americans here at home? These are serious issues and have been the subject of much national debate. Just recently, Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center ("5 Myths About All Those Nukes Out There," Washington Post, March 1, 2009) and Thomas Skypek of the Weekly Standard, ("Thinking About the Unthinkable: Priorities for the Upcoming Nuclear Posture Review," March 3, 2009), discussed the issue but from considerably different perspectives. Missing, however, in most analyses is a careful attempt to define the threat. Too often, nuclear terrorism is seen as solely the province of "radical Islam" led by Jihadi groups such as the Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah or al Qaeda. Too often reference to the sponsors, partners and masters of these groups, most notably Iran, Syria, and elements of the Pakistani and Saudi Governments is absent. For example, we are told by Krepon that the possibility of such terror groups achieving the capability of producing nuclear weapons by themselves is remote, which it may be. But if nuclear weapons developed or possessed by the terror masters in Tehran or Pyongyang are sold or transferred to terror groups to use against the U.S. and its allies, then the providence of such weapons is rather irrelevant to whether or not terror groups have the technical sophistication to make such weapons in the first place. Nuclear terrorism also involves the brandishing of such weapons as a tool of diplomacy and coercion. This includes the Russian threat to deploy such weapons in the enclave of Kaliningrad in order to threaten Poland and Eastern Europe, ostensibly as a counter to U.S., NATO and allied proposals to build a missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. China, too, has used the threat of nuclear attack as a means of intimidating the United States and undermining its willingness to defend the Republic of Taiwan. And of course North Korea has repeatedly used the threat of nuclear attack to pressure the U.S. to ratchet down its military cooperation with the Republic of Korea and its defense of Seoul. We should understand nuclear weapons can be a tool of the "wicked" in a world where both terror masters and puppets work together to camouflage their dirty work. This should be relatively easy to understand. For example, the "terror attacks," such as those taking place in Beirut, above Lockerbie, at the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, or in the city of Mumbai, were all "state sponsored". Libya, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Cuba, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria were the top "terror masters". Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq - not quite half - have been erased from that role at great cost in blood and treasure. But one can hardly find reference to the significance of this. It is too often a common assumption of "experts" and the media that "shadowy groups" of terrorists, often described under the brand name of "al Qaeda", are responsible for such attacks. It is sheer intellectual dishonesty and laziness that undergirds such reporting, but it is also dangerous. It allows states to hide their role and objectives. In fact, it is far more often the case that states, including military services, intelligence agencies, and government ministries provide the sanctuary for terrorist to train and hide; the financing for terrorists to purchase their weapons, rent their safe houses and travel; the weapons and explosives with which to maim and kill; and the direction and planning for such attacks. When we forget this, it deflects our attention from deterring or destroying these various states as well as their allied terrorist groups. And it also confuses Americans as they do not know what threats we are facing. We often hear we are facing "fanatical Muslims." But who are they? They do not wear identity badges. In reality, I do not believe we are not at war with 1.2 billion Muslims. The vast majority of such people do not follow the injunctions of Mullahs that command people to kill Jews and Christians. On the other hand, many that do are brainwashed in Mosques, funded primarily by Saudi Arabia, from which the recruits for terror operations are drawn. These people are a serious danger, but their threat is exponentially increased by their conjunction with what Michael Ledeen calls the "terror masters" - the states that are at war with the United States. The idea of "state sponsors of terror" should not be that difficult to grasp. Each year the U.S. Department of State publishes an assessment of what it describes as officially designated "state sponsors of terror." But while such reporting gets published in annual security assessments, the official position of the Department is too often that these very same sponsors of terrorism are also possibly new "partners for peace". This certainly is confusing. But it highlights the confusion between seeing the threat as "radical Islam" as opposed to states that have been at war with the U.S. for decades who use the top cover of "religion" to hide behind what is in essence a war for power and hegemony. In this light, the tools of diplomacy, military power and our economic might can be used to leverage states either to stop such activity or disrupt their campaigns. Take Iran, for example. Divestment can deprive Iran of billions in investment funds for their energy sector which alone could seriously undermine the regime's stature. Private sector entities, whether in public pension systems or endowments in the U.S., could be persuaded to choose between investing in Iran or in America. So, too, could the United States work to interrupt the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran, which imports fully 40% of its gasoline. FDD, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, is leading a coalition to secure the cooperation of oil sector private entities to cease their support for the Iranian economy. There is also the alternative of blockading Iranian ports and stopping the supply of oil either from or to Tehran. Added to that is the Proliferation Security Initiative, now made up of nearly 100 nations, that can interdict the technologies of weapons of mass destruction, just as the United States did with over 10,000 nuclear centrifuges destined for Libya as part of a cargo shipped by the A.Q. Khan, "Nukes 'R Us" smuggling operation. Missile defense deployments in the Gulf region and Europe especially those planned for central Europe in Poland and the Czech Republic would also be critical for efforts to confront Iran. Such deployments could undergird U.S. and NATO diplomacy aimed at stronger and effective sanctions, which to date have been relatively weak and ineffective. Iran's missile capabilities are expanding as it receives assistance from other countries, most notably North Korea. Reports are that such missiles as the BM-25 when deployed would have a range of 3500 kilometers while carrying a militarily significant payload. When mated with a nuclear weapon, now under development by Tehran and possibly operational within the next year if not already, Iran will pose an existential threat to Israel and a gathering danger to U.S. forces and its allies. However much we wish that diplomacy could end this danger, sole reliance upon the good offices of diplomats and ambassadors is fraught with peril. Unfortunately, as this threat grows, there are those who claim such missile threats are dramatically declining. This is based on taking the Soviet missiles prior to the end of the Cold War and comparing the inventory then with that of the Russian Federation now, after the successful completion of the START and SORT treaties which dramatically reduced such Russian missiles and warheads. It also ignores the growing Chinese arsenal of both land based and sea-based missiles and the prospects of the PRC having some 600 warheads in its SLBM fleet alone with which to threaten the U.S. And finally, such assessments ignore the current North Korean capability to land a 200 kilogram warhead on the western continental United States, according to national intelligence assessments of the past decade. There is always the hope that diplomacy will be able to pull a non-proliferation rabbit out of the proverbial Iranian nuclear hat. But while the U.S. has reportedly sought Russian assistance in stopping the Iranian nuclear program, we have also reportedly been rebuffed by the current Russian President who claimed it would be counter-productive to link U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe - which Russia says threaten Moscow - and Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. From Russia's perspective, any acknowledgment of such a link between the two would of course completely shred their opposition to U.S. missile defense deployments of any veneer of credibility. Iran is at war with the United States and our allies. They have killed Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are killing Israelis and Lebanese. An understanding of this threat then would put into quite different perspective the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense and security policy. The premise that the current U.S. nuclear posture is the primary driver of nuclear proliferation becomes silly nonsense. In fact, even as Krepon acknowledges, the U.S. nuclear deterrent, acting as a defense umbrella for our allies, has made proliferation amongst our allies far less likely. This then requires the U.S. to maintain a nuclear deterrent second to none. As Skypek correctly points out, "the erosion of American nuclear superiority will have major ramifications for the global balance of power. It will replace new constraints on our freedom of action and lead our friends and foes alike to doubt the credibility of all instruments of U.S. power." He further explains that a credible U.S. deterrent policy "rests on modernized forces and a clear doctrine for the employment of these forces." Finally, he wisely explains a U.S. missile defense deployment, (especially in the boost phase), strengthens deterrence and enables "Washington to hedge against the possibility of a deterrence failure from rogue states such as Iran." Furthermore, the ability of nuclear forensics to credibly identify the origin of nuclear material enhances the U.S. ability to deter Iran should the regime contemplate the transfer of such a weapon to terror groups. Such a deterrent cannot, however, rest on one technology or be artificially driven to such low level deployments to where strategic stability is undermined and worsened. A sea-based deterrent alone, for example, would according to the CBO require nearly $90 billion in expenditures for new submarines alone with another $5-7 billion for missiles. Such expenditures could be phased in over time when the current Trident fleet is replaced but only if at the same time we maintain the entire fleet of 450 Minuteman III missiles. For a relatively small additional cost of $7 billion, and an expense coming due largely after 2020, the nearly complete service-life extension plan for Minuteman could be further enhanced and extended to where the land-based leg of our Triad provides deterrent insurance for an additional 30 years.* A number of key advantages accrue to the U.S. by adopting a dual policy of replacing both the Minuteman and the Trident fleet and maintaining the benefits of the current Triad of nuclear forces. The widely dispersed and deployed Minuteman, over portions of some five states, means any calculated pre-emptive attack on the missile silos would be mathematically impossible to carry out. Why? Because the number of deployed weapons in the Russian arsenal under the nearly implemented Moscow Treaty is so dramatically reduced that any fear of a Russian "prompt launch" goes away. No sudden, un-expected "bolt out of the blue" remains on our radar. To attack all 450 silos would require the full generation of Russian forces, something U.S. satellites would readily identify. A final advantage is that while a sea-based only deterrent would give the Russians a 160 to 1 ratio of warheads to U.S. targets, while the current mixed fleet of submarines and ICBMs, (with fewer warheads) would reduce the ratio roughly to 2 to 1, somewhat comparable to the ratio of U.S. warheads to Russian SLBM, ICBM and bomber targets that would be on the order of 3 to 1.** This means, in turn, that an American President need not worry about the alert status of the Minuteman missiles leading in turn to a possible U.S. "prompt launch." Having no worry that Russian rockets would be launched in a crisis at US land-based missile silos - because there would be no guarantee that a large fraction of U.S. missile warheads would not survive an attack - a U.S. President would actually have greater time in which to make a decision involving the employ of US nuclear weapons than during the Cold War. Minuteman thus brings greater stability to world order, not less. This in turn means that efforts to "de-alert" U.S. or Russian missiles becomes a bad idea in search of a problem, not the least of which is no such de-alerting action is largely non-verifiable. Returning to our beginning, the threat of nuclear terrorism is intimately tied up with the development of nuclear weapons by state sponsors of terror and their goals of grievously harming the United States. Iran has made no secret of its desire to see a world "without the Great Satan." Its leaders have boasted of how nuclear weapons would destroy Israel but still leave the Iranian revolution intact. Iraq was fought to remove from power Saddam and his Ba'athist thugs who had sponsored the attacks on the United States in 1993 and 2001 involving the World Trade Center. Robert Spencer's latest book Stealth Jihad correctly identifies the mastermind of the 1993 attack - Ramzi Yousef - as "an Iraqi intelligence agent." It is not a coincidence that his uncle Khalid Sheik Mohammed was the mastermind of the 2001 attacks; or that both were planning to blow up five American aircraft over the Pacific in 1995 in the plot we call "Bojinka;" or that Yousef himself was in the same Philippine city at exactly the same time as the leader of the Oklahoma City bombing. That is why we fought to liberate Iraq and Afghanistan from the regimes that had attacked us. And that is why we need to keep our eye on the target - the states that conspire and plot to kill Americans. That requires an entire range of strategic tools, including the maintenance of a deterrent, and especially a nuclear deterrent, second to none. The world needs a policeman with a big stick - to both keep the wicked in their cages and to reassure our friends. *The current ICBM service life extension plan is nearly complete and is estimated to be able to maintain the Minuteman fleet through the period 2020-30. However, to continue the force beyond that period, work would need to be initiated soon. USAF long range planning is currently moving in that direction. The annual cost of doing so is a small fraction of the current nuclear enterprise expenditures. **These estimates are based on a notional force of 1000 deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads and do not necessarily imply there would not be an additional number of warheads for a bomber force that is nuclear capable. FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Huessy is a Senior Defense Associate of the National Defense University Association and President of GeoStratic Analysis.